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ABSTRACT:  
 
The United States presents a paradox. The US state has  practiced 
production-focused industrial policy from the early years of the 
Republic, with benefits that by any plausible measure far exceed  
costs. But since the 1980s the exchange-focused idea that “the 
free market is what works, and having the state help it is usually 
a contradiction in terms” has been at the normative center of 
gravity in public policy discourse.   “Industrial policy” has been 
toxic. So since the 1980s the state has disguised its production-
focused  practice,  to the point where even non-ideological 
academic researchers claim that the US does industrial policy not 
at all, or badly. This essay reviews the history of US industrial 
policy, with an emphasis on “network-building industrial policy” 
over the past two decades. At the end it draws a lesson for policy 
communities in other  countries and in inter-state development 
organizations like the World Bank and the IMF. 
…………..    
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“The most innovative entrepreneur in the 20th century was the U.S. 
government”  (Michael Lind, author of Land of Promise: An Economic 
History of the United  States )  
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“The best American industrial policy is to convince the world that America 
has no (effective) industrial policy” (quip among heterodox economists)  
 
“The present round of industrial policy will no doubt produce some modest 
successes – and a crop of whopping failures” (The Economist, 5 August 
2010) 
 
 
…………  
 
For the past eight decades the American political debate – 
as in much of the West – has been structured around the size and 
scope of government. Republicans want less government and 
more “liberty”, Democrats want more government and more 
“equity”, broadly speaking. The economic crisis of the 1970s, 
followed by the election of Ronald Reagan,  ushered in what 
turned out to be a durable shift of the normative center of gravity 
towards “smaller and narrower government”. Declarations like, 
“The free market is what works, and having the state help it is 
usually a contradiction in terms”, set heads nodding in agreement 
(Kasperov 2012: 6).  1  Following the crisis of 2008 a prominent 
libertarian funder announced that the United States was “facing 
the greatest loss of liberty and prosperity since the 1930s”, due to 
the Obama administration’s new regulations, public works 
programs and  government agencies (Koch, 2009). Newt 
Gingrich, Speaker of the House of Representatives from 1995 to 
1999 and thereby second in the presidential line of succession 
after the Vice President, told readers of his 2010 book, To Save 
America, that the Obama administration “represents as great a 
threat to America as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union once did” 
(Gingrich, 2010). 2  
 
                                                 
1 In this vein, Jacquelyn Brechtel Clarkson, a New Orleans city councilor,  saw “nothing better than 
free enterprise and the free market to decide how this city is rebuilt” following the devastating floods 
there (quoted in the Financial Times, 10 January 2006).  
 
2 For an account of how  billionaires and their organizations push the American intellectual climate to 
the radical right, including via the ideological production line of think-tanks and  university 
endowments, see Mayer, 2016.  
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These statements come from the right-wing of the spectrum, 
but their view of government exerts a gravitational pull across 
American public policy and academic economics.  So “industrial 
policy” is widely understood as “porkbarrel politics”, “rent-
seeking”, “corporate welfare”, “crowding out  private enterprise” 
and  “picking winners”. It is seen as a Trojan Horse for 
distortionary government intervention that corrodes the values of 
an entrepreneurial culture, undermines the efficacy of market 
competition and stacks the incentive system in favour of one or 
other rent-seeking groups.  “Governments cannot pick winners,  
but losers can pick governments”. 3 
 
 A study of US industrial policy for biotech concluded:  
 
“The knowledge economy [in biotech] did not spontaneously 
emerge from the bottom up, but was prompted by a top-down 
stealth industrial policy; government and industry leaders 
simultaneously advocated government intervention to foster the 
development of the biotechnology industry and argued 
hypocritically that government should let the free market work” 
(Vallas et al., 2011, emphasis added).  
 
When official bodies do endorse industrial policies – though 
they rarely use this phrase – they invoke the justification of 
“market failures”. The international market, not government, 
should set the directional signals for investment,  except where 
markets fail in some sense and where the benefits of 
“intervention” are very likely to exceed the costs. So the central 
recommendation of the President’s Council of Advisors on 
Science and Technology’s June 2011 report on manufacturing 
explained that the core challenge in reviving US manufacturing 
was to “overcome market failures”. The Department of 
Commerce’s June 2012 report on “U.S. competitiveness and 
innovation capacity” also suggested that the government’s core 
role is to correct market failures and provide an environment 
                                                 
3 This essay  is one of several  about industrial policy by the same author: for example, Wade, 2004,  
2010, 2012, 2016 
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conducive to innovation-in-general via tax policy and patent law 
(Department of Commerce, 2012).  
 
In  March 2012 Gene Sperling, director of the White 
House’s national economic council, declared that a national 
manufacturing renaissance would be strongly in America’s 
interest (Sperling, 2012) . His speech  was notable for two 
reasons. First, it was the first time that a key figure in the Obama 
administration – or for that matter in any of the past several 
administrations – spoke positively of manufacturing and the need 
to mount industrial policies to help the sector.  Second, the speech 
disappeared without trace.  
 
 Here is the American paradox. On the one hand, the “market 
fundamentalist” narrative has long dominated public policy 
discourse, drawing affirmation not only from neoclassical 
economic theory, but also from its elision of “market forces” with 
beyond-question values like “freedom”, “democracy”, 
“meritocracy”, “self-reliance”, “the God-designed, natural 
order”, and its elision of “government intervention” with 
“economic sclerosis”, “the nanny state”,  “the road to serfdom”.  
In this narrative the US does little by way of industrial policy, and 
what it does is mostly ineffective or  harmful.  So the fact that the 
US continues to lead the world in industrial and military 
innovation is apparently unrelated to selective government 
programs.  
 
On the other hand,  the government has in fact undertaken 
much more industrial policy than the standard narrative says, 
from the founding of the Republic till today. Its efforts have 
ranged from promoting what became major technological 
innovations (“general purpose technologies”),  to specific sector 
applications and products, to --  at the  nudging  end -- 
manufacturing extension services similar to agricultural 
extension services (Block and Keller [eds.],  2011, Weiss, 2014). 
In some sectors some of the time, the government has “led the 
market”, taking initiatives the private sector would not do unaided 
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(this is sometimes called “mission-oriented” industrial policy). In 
some sectors some of the time, the government has “followed the 
market”, placing bets on some of the investments  private firms 
were already undertaking. The government has also mounted 
“horizontal industrial policy” to boost certain functions without 
discrimination between sectors,  such as special credit lines for 
small and medium enterprises or subsidies for R&D (Wade, 
1990).    
 
In response to the legitimacy of the market fundamentalist 
narrative,  agencies involved in industrial policy in the past two 
to three decades have gone out of their way to keep their programs 
off the radar of public (and academic) attention.   The eclipse has 
been so effective  that it is not generally known that a US 
government agency’s program  spawned the Internet. The rate of 
return on the publicly-funded part of this one innovation must be 
high enough to offset by far whatever “mistakes” the government 
made elsewhere by way of “government intervention”.  
 
Or take the case of Apple, whose narrative attributes its 
success to Steve Jobs and his credo “Stay hungry, stay foolish”. 
In fact, as Mariana Mazzucato says, “the genius and ‘foolishness’ 
of Steve Jobs led to massive profits and success, largely because 
Apple [whose R&D to sales ratio over 2006 – 2011 put it in the 
bottom three among 13 of its top rivals] was able to ride the wave 
of massive State investments in the ‘revolutionary’ technologies 
that underpinned the iPhone and iPad:  the Internet, GPS, touch-
screen displays and communication technologies. Without these 
publicly funded technologies, there would have been no wave to 
foolishly surf” (Mazzucato 2013, 88). 
 
 The American hostility to industrial policy  fed into global 
hostility through inter-state organizations such as the World 
Bank, the IMF and the OECD.  Western-governed development 
organizations turned away from the idea of development as the 
expansion of production capabilities (including industrialization) 
and emphasised development as the expansion of exchange (“the 
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market”), coupled with targeted measures to reduce poverty.    
When Justin Yifu Lin became chief economist of the World Bank 
in 2008 (the first-ever  non-G7 chief economist) he tried to 
promote interest in a modest kind of production-focused policy ( 
“industrial policy”), in which a government  promotes selected 
industries while staying within the economy’s existing 
comparative advantage.  Virtually none of the regional vice-
presidents were interested in mounting pilot projects, and the 
whole idea was dismissed by a senior economist in Lin’s own 
research department,  “For every Korea there are a hundred 
failures. Who would you put your money on?” (personal 
communication).  
 
The global  hostility to industrial policy draws strength from 
the – mistaken -- belief that the US does not do industrial policy.  
  
The first section below gives a galloping history of U.S. 
industrial policy from the first years of the Republic through the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
 
The second section describes the prevailing arguments  
which have served to delegitimize  industrial policy during the 
past two to three decades.   
 
Section three builds on the point that some people and some 
parts of the US state are alarmed by the way that financial 
deregulation has placed  business managers under more 
shareholder and bonus pressure than ever before, resulting  in  
managers  cutting investment in basic technologies in order to 
focus on short-term “value extraction”, relying  on public 
agencies for basic research and pre-commercialization. Some 
public officials  are also alarmed by the way that  managers of 
high-tech “start-ups” commonly shift  “scale-ups” overseas to 
cheap labor sites, limiting the growth of manufacturing jobs and 
eroding innovation at home (which depends on a close link with 
production, future capabilities being path-dependent on existing 
capabilities).  
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In response, the US has established, without coherent 
design, a “developmental state” in disguise,  distinctly different 
from the East Asian kind.  Government agencies, at federal and 
state levels, have attempted to lead low-visibility networks of 
suppliers, subcontractors, middlemen, venture capitalists, 
laboratories, and universities, in order to (1) accelerate the move 
from technological breakthrough to commercial products, and (2) 
supply themselves with frontier products and services they need 
for their own mission. This could be called “network industrial 
policy”.  However, it is much easier said than done, because 
networks between competing firms tend to be fragile and prone 
to break-up on account of Prisoners’ Dilemma incentives.  
 
Section four gives examples of successful recent network 
industrial policy, referring to the Defence Advanced Research 
Projects Agency and its SEMATECH advanced semiconductor 
equipment manufacturer, public-sector (including CIA) venture 
capital funds, and the Advanced Technology Program.  
 
Section five describes some cases of relative failure drawn 
from the energy field, compared with corresponding successes in 
Denmark and Japan.  
 
Section six offers a broad assessment of  effectiveness.  
 
The last section summarizes the argument about the 
disjunction between the ideology of free markets, which places 
the expansion of “exchange” at the center of public policy, and 
the practice of boosting “production” capabilities in high-tech 
sectors. It  indicates some directions of change to make US 
industrial policy more effective, and draws a lesson for the policy 
community in other countries, including developing countries.  
 
The discussion uses “industrial policy” to cover the whole 
value chain involved in making things, including the services of 
scientists and engineers who design and test the things – the 
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medical pills, the automobiles, the smart phones, and the rest --
whose actual manufacturing may be abroad. What differentiates 
industrial policy from other policy is that it is necessarily 
selective between industries, products, and stages of the value 
chain.   
  
I. The first two centuries of the US developmental state 
 
 Fighting and preparing to fight wars spurred American 
innovation and economic growth from the beginning, as also for 
continental European countries and pre-British Indian states.   
Alexander Hamilton, the first Treasury Secretary, outlined a 
strategy for promoting American manufacturing, with the aim of 
catching up with British manufacturing and providing the base for 
a strong military. Published in 1791 and called Report on 
Manufactures, it championed not just tariffs, but also the strategic 
use of subsidies, tariff drawbacks on imported inputs used for 
exports, export bans on key raw materials, public procurement, 
product standards, and immigration (O’Sullivan et al, 2013). 
George Washington, the first president, supported the plan. Also, 
from the first years of the Republic the government invested in 
technological expertise for military purposes. It created the Army 
Corps of Engineers in 1802 and put army engineers to work 
building canals and lighthouses and improving river navigation.  
 
Later, Abraham Lincoln presided over what was by then 
called “The American System” for promoting increases in income 
and wealth, using high tariffs to protect strategic industries, 
federal land grants, government procurement to secure markets 
and subsidies to infrastructure development. Lincoln launched the 
building of the transcontinental railway in the 1860s, probably the 
most ambitious civil engineering project in world history to that 
time, linking the established agro-industrial bloc with the 
emerging engineering bloc. Federal- and state- supported R&D 
started in agriculture in the 1860s. Agencies at both levels used 
public authority and resources to build  links between education 
establishments and  dedicated civil  servants and scientists in 
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areas such as animal husbandry, agricultural chemistry, forestry 
and mining.   
 
All through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries US 
industrialization proceeded behind average applied industrial 
tariffs exceeding 30% up to the 1930s, justified by ideas 
articulated in Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures (Kozul-
Wright, 1995). Here the US was doing the same as other countries 
engaged in catch-up to the leading countries, except that its trade 
protection was among the most generous.  Like these others, the 
US scaled protection down as its firms became internationally 
competitive. Then from the 1970s the US and other western 
countries created a trade regime which forced other countries to 
cut protection to low levels as a condition of access to their 
markets,  justified with the argument that expanding exchange 
was the best way to boost production capacities.   
 
From the turn of the twentieth century US government 
procurement, the provision of  formal scientific training in public 
organizations,  and  product and process standards proved critical 
for establishing and enlarging mass-market industries. Early in 
the twentieth century the federal government used airmail fees to 
subsidize the infant civil aviation industry. It used public 
procurement to establish an early aircraft industry and advanced 
chemical sector. Its commitment to agricultural research and 
engineering training expanded after World War One through such 
initiatives as the Adam Act and public laboratories committed to 
applied experimentation and upgrading (Nelson and Wright, 
1992). The government was also heavily involved in establishing 
the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), which sponsored radio 
and TV networks.  
 
  The New Deal provided the context for a more concerted 
US industrial policy involving efforts not only to ensure industrial 
recovery from the Great Depression but also to change the way 
business behaved and help increasingly large firms to operate 
more efficiently.  Doing so involved new institutions, norms and 
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rules to administer prices, to boost dialogue among the various 
stakeholders, to provide public infrastructure and curtail the 
power of finance. These efforts were often contested and their 
impact uneven (Blyth 2002,  Badger 2008) .  
 
The most visible form of a developmental industrial policy 
was the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) established in May 
1933. The TVA was conceived as a development agency, 
mandated to raise living standards in the impoverished Tennessee 
River Valley, and also as a construction and management agency 
mandated to build and operate dams and structures along the 
Tennessee River, whose drainage basin over seven states covers 
some 40,900 square miles (105,930 square kilometres). The TVA 
was to function, in Roosevelt’s words, as "a corporation clothed 
with the power of government but possessed of the flexibility and 
initiative of a private enterprise".  Over the 12-year period 
spanning its inception in 1933 and the end of Second World War 
in 1945, TVA established its institutional framework, built broad-
based local support for its programmes, and constructed a 
physical infrastructure that would serve as the backbone for its 
accomplishments. By triggering an increase in the rates of return 
to private investment in the southern US states, the infusion of 
public capital through the  TVA sped up post-war 
industrialization of the southern economy. 
 
 The US military undertook an overarching national 
planning project as it geared up to enter World War Two. General 
George Marshall commissioned the preparation of the Victory 
Plan of 1941. It planned “the future organization of an army that 
did not exist, outlined combat missions for a war not yet declared, 
and computed war production requirements for industries that 
were still committed to peacetime manufacture” (Kirkpatrick, 
1990).  
  
The war-time government-military-industrial complex went 
on subsequently to launch a series of mission-oriented projects 
which yielded fundamental innovations, including the atomic 
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bomb, the hydrogen bomb, missile technology, civilian nuclear 
power, computers, the transistor, preparatory work on the laser, 
space rockets and satellites. The dominant approach to selective 
industrial policy took the form of government support for a 
plethora of military laboratories in “basic” research, coupled with 
long-term public procurement contracts with big-name military 
firms, as well as subsidies, investment guarantees and bailout 
measures. Hence the quip,  “America has had three types of 
industrial policy: first, World War Two, second, the Korean War, 
and third, the Vietnam War”.  The focus on “basic” and “military” 
avoided the ideological issues around industrial policy, because 
even market fundamentalists accepted that government should 
fund the development of new weapons and intelligence systems.  
 
Those opposed to “state intervention” tend to airbrush this 
extensive history away, and claim that from the founding of the 
Republic to the start of the Roosevelt’s New Deal in the 1930s 
the US grew fast in the context of a state which limited its 
economic role to providing an institutional “level playing field” 
framework for markets. They further claim that the US then took 
a wrong turn at the time of the New Deal towards excessive state 
intervention.4 The election of Ronald Reagan as president in 1980 
did much to revive  this simplistic narrative of “the government 
is the problem, not the solution”. 
 
Michael Lind, author of Land of Promise: An Economic 
History of the United  States, summarizes:   
 
“The most innovative entrepreneur in the 20th century was the 
U.S. government. The federal government invented or developed 
nuclear energy, computers, the Internet and the jet engine. And it 
built the interstate highway system and the completed the national 
electric grid, creating a continental market based on the 
technologies of the second industrial revolution. To be sure, the 
                                                 
4 While some prominent Americans in the fledgling international organizations established at the end 
of the Second World War came from the New Deal tradition, the first cohorts of Americans in senior 
positions at the World Bank through the 1940s and 1950s tended to be strongly anti-state and anti-New 
Deal. The powerful first vice-president, Robert Garner, declared in his 1972 memoir, “Roosevelt … did 
more harm to this country than anyone else in history”. Quoted in  Alacevich, 2009, at 32.  
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government has sometimes backed failures, usually in the fad-
driven energy field…. But few private venture capitalists can 
match the remarkable record of success of Uncle Sam. Indeed, 
venture capitalists in IT and social networking have exploited and 
commercialized technologies from the transistor to the Internet 
that were originally developed by America’s home-grown 
version of state capitalism”  (Lind, 2012).  
 
 
II.  Industrial policy becomes toxic 
 
Through the 1980s and later mainstream economists 
declared themselves sure that industrial policy is a bad idea. 
According to Gary Becker, who was awarded the Bank of Sweden 
Prize in Economic Science in Memory of Alfred Nobel,   “The 
best industrial policy is none at all” (Becker, 1985). The 
distinguished development economist John Williamson, coiner of 
the phrase “the Washington Consensus”, said, “Little in the 
record of industrial policy suggests that the state is very good at 
‘picking winners’” (Williamson, 2012, 10). Lawrence Summers -
- a prominent public intellectual in the United States, professor 
economics at Harvard, former US Treasury Secretary and former 
chief economist of the World Bank – declared that  government 
“is a crappy VC [venture capitalist]”  (quoted in Nocera, 2011).   
 
A British economist, Tim Leunig of the London School of 
Economics, echoed back:   
 
“The government should be providing conditions that help all 
businesses – namely, effective infrastructure, a skilled workforce 
and better planning. We should make no attempt to pick winners 
– whether individual companies, specific sectors, or 
manufacturing as a whole” (Leunig 2010, 14).  
 
  Commentating on the state of opinion among mainstream 
economists, Michael Lind says, “It would be easy to get a 
thousand Ph.D economists [trained in the Anglo-American 
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milieu] to sign a manifesto insisting that we should ignore history 
whenever it conflicts with theory… about generic firms 
competing in abstract markets” (Lind 2012). 5 
 
Mainstream economists rest their “should” on theoretical 
ideas like Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu’s  First 
Fundamental Theorem of welfare economics, as well as  the 
“market generally works best” ideology which suffuses 
university teaching in economics. But in fact, the theory is 
ambiguous.  The First Fundamental Theorem states that markets 
are the most efficient resource allocators when: (1) there is a 
complete set of markets with publicly-known prices; (2) 
consumers and producers are price-takers and in that sense 
behave competitively; (3) an equilibrium exists. These 
conditions make a castle in the sky. To the extent they  are not 
met the theorem does not provide theoretical grounds against  
industrial policy.  
 
The empirical evidence is also inconclusive, because of the 
difficulty of finding cases with an exogenous source of variation 
with which to test causality “rigorously”.  So we are left mostly 
with correlations between policies and outcomes, which can 
always be disputed.  In the face of inconclusive theory and 
empirics and an ideological current in the opposite direction,  
few “top” economists are drawn to work on industrial policy and 
few “top” economics journals publish papers about industrial 
policy. 
 
 
Analysts with  a more political perspective come to broadly 
the same conclusion against industrial policy in the US and other 
Anglo countries, based on an analysis of what works and does not 
work in certain varieties of capitalism.  
 
                                                 
5  The “Anglo-American milieu” in economics  spans most economics teaching in Europe and the 
Americas, and much of the rest of the world as well. For its deep penetration in the Republic of 
Georgia,  and specifically the deep penetration of Gregory Mankiw’s Principles of Economics, see 
Wade 2016b.    
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 The political economists Peter Hall and David Soskice have 
no ideological agenda against “government” and for “markets”. 
Rather, they argue that the shape of state-market institutions in 
the US, also the UK,  is such that industrial policy is unlikely to 
be effective in improving on market outcomes when judged by a 
national interest test.  
 
Advanced capitalist economies, they argue , tend to cluster 
with little hybridity into one of two types at the national level: the 
“liberal market economy” (LME), exemplified by the US and 
UK, and the “coordinated market economy” (CME), exemplified 
by Germany and Japan. Firms in LMEs coordinate their activities 
mainly through the institutions of markets and hierarchies, and 
tend to invest in “switchable assets” (which allow rapid entry and 
exit). Firms in CMEs coordinate relatively more through 
institutions which support ongoing cooperation, encourage 
credible commitments and exchange of information, and “provide 
actors potentially able to cooperate with one another with a 
capacity for deliberation” (Hall and Soskice, 2001, 11). Examples 
of such institutions include business associations, trade unions, 
cross-shareholding networks, and legal systems that facilitate 
information sharing.  
 
 Hall and Soskice and others in the “varieties of capitalism”  
school argue that industrial policy is more likely to be effective 
in CMEs than in LMEs, because of the weakness of institutional 
support in the latter. For the US, specifically, they argue that 
industrial policy is further hobbled by two fundamental political 
features:  (1) strong separation of powers between the executive, 
legislature and judiciary; and (2) strong separation of powers 
between the federal, state and local levels.  
 
 The sociologist Michael Mann agrees: 
 
“There is no serious American industrial policy; this is left to the 
post-war powerhouses of the US economy, the large corporations. 
Much of this [industrial policy failure] is due to the radical 
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separation of powers enshrined in the US constitution. A 
coordinated political economy cannot easily be run by a President 
and his cabinet, two Houses of Congress, a Supreme Court and 
fifty ‘states’ (which are also fragmented by the same separation 
of powers) – especially when they belong to different political 
parties” (Mann, 1997, 484, emphasis added).   
 
 
 In these conditions the US and other LME governments 
may practice what is sometimes called industrial policy; but it is 
uncoordinated and yields negative net welfare gains, as vested 
interests capture the relevant parts of the state apparatus and 
sluice resources in their favour. Kevin Philips goes so far as to 
say that  industrial policy in a fragmented political structure like 
the US is both “inevitable and ineffective” (Philips, 1992, 104). 
Frank Dobbin reports that the conventional wisdom in political 
sociology is that “American state structure is better suited to 
inchoate, misguided bailouts characterized by political graft than 
to coherent, disinterested, planning on the Japanese model” 
(Dobbins  1993, 251).  
 
Yet it is generally accepted that no other country comes 
close to America’s capacity to reinvent itself through technology.  
Think of inventions like aircraft, automobiles,  the computer, and 
the Internet.  In the past decade  US companies like Apple and 
Google battered Canada’s RIM and Finland’s Nokia in 
smartphones. Its companies launched 4G services well before 
others, having been far behind Europe in launching 3G in 2005. 
In energy,  small companies like Devon Energy and Chesapeake 
(not the global oil majors) have developed commercially viable 
hydraulic fracking technology, sharply  reducing US dependence 
on imports of oil and liquefied natural gas (Gapper, 2012). 
 
So the common argument says that (1) the US has remained 
on the frontiers of world technology for many decades, (2) it has 
not used industrial policy, or if so, only on a small scale (hence 
the inevitable rent-seeking costs to society have been kept small), 
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(3) other countries should not try industrial policy -- as distinct 
from improving the overall business and science environment, 
and especially, expanding the scope for exchange.  
  
 
III. Emergence of the network developmental state 
   
 What follows is the story which most economists and 
commentators on the US economy miss.  
 
Through the decades of industrial policy under the military 
umbrella the government  assumed that “the market” would 
transform the results of military-related R&D more or less 
automatically into commercial innovations in civilian industry.  
By the 1980s  a narrow circle of scientists, business school 
academics and technology policy officials realized that military-
related technologies were being carried into commercial 
applications only patchily; and that, partly for this reason, US 
industrialists were being outcompeted across a swathe of high-
tech industry by Japanese and  German firms.  Between basic 
research outputs and commercial products lurked  the “valley of 
death”, where potential products languished for want of private 
sector uptake (Scott and Lodge, 1985).  
 
 In response, agencies  like the Department of Defence 
(responsible for about half of federal R&D spending over the 
2000s), the Department of Energy and the National Institutes of 
Health, decided to act – with the aims, first, to accelerate the move 
“from R to D”, from technological breakthroughs to commercial 
products (“following the market”), and second, to incentivize the 
private sector to develop latest-generation products which the  
agencies themselves wanted for their own work (“leading the 
market”).  
 
 Yet all the while the  problems mounted:  military research 
did not spill over into civilian uses “by itself” (by the market); 
Japan and Germany provided tough competition; the US trade 
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surplus in technologically sophisticated products (which helped 
to offset growing deficits for raw materials and basic 
manufactured goods) shrank.   
 
 Government officials began to formulate the general 
strategy on the basis of the success, through the 1970s, of the 
Defence Department’s Defence Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) in channelling vast federal funds for 
coordinated  R&D at the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory and the universities of Stanford and California at 
Berkeley,  co-located within a couple of hours’ drive of each 
other. Private spin-off firms from these programs then helped to 
turn Silicon Valley from orchards into the planetary center of 
innovation in computing.  
 
The public officials also drew inspiration from 
developments in biotechnology in the 1970s, notably the birth of 
Genentech in 1976, which showed how government agencies 
could help university-based scientists establish successful firms. 
 
 In the subsequent decades many government agencies, at 
national, state, and even city level have funded R&D  in selected 
sectors. At national level the agencies include Department of 
Defence, DARPA, ARPA-E (Advanced Research Projects 
Agency-Energy), Department of Energy,   National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), Small Business Administration (SBA), National Science 
Foundation (NSF), National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, and more.   
 
There is no powerful coordinating center equivalent to 
Japan’s  tripos of MITI, the Economic Planning Agency, and the 
Ministry of Finance  during the post-war catch-up decades; or 
counterparts in Taiwan and South Korea (Johnson, 1982; 
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, 1995). But a degree of 
coordination comes through a multitude of apex advisory bodies. 
A prime example is the Presidential Council of Advisors on 
  
18 
18 
Science and Technology (PCAST), established in 1990 in a line 
of descent  from the Science Advisory Board established by 
Franklin Roosevelt.  Reporting directly to the President and 
administered by the Office of Science and Technology, it 
currently comprises 18 distinguished individuals from industry, 
education, and research institutes.  Recent reports deal with 
antibiotic resistance, educational technology, cybersecurity, 
climate change, information technology and agricultural 
preparedness.  Working with  it recently has been the Advanced 
Manufacturing Partnership, another advisory council targeting 
advanced sensing, digital manufacturing and advanced materials.  
 
At the operational level, epochal changes in the structure of 
production over the past three decades have prompted changes in 
how agencies intervene. Before 1980 large firms internalised 
most of their activities and met the rest through arms-length 
relations in more or less competitive markets. Government 
agencies could contract with individual large firms in a bilateral 
manner. Since then, production has become more decentralized, 
both geographically and organizationally. In the more 
decentralized structure, firms and other participants sometimes 
establish, on their own, trusting, reciprocal “network” relations 
with duration over time, modifying arms-length relations. 
However, “self-starting” networks tend to be fragile and prone to 
break-up due to Prisoners’ Dilemma incentives. Network steering 
public agencies help to offset the tendency for private actors to 
defect from networks, exit basic research and scale-up overseas.  
 
 For example, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) organizes Manufacturing Extension 
Partnerships through MEP centers in all 50 states. The program 
was started in 1988 in response to Japanese manufacturing 
competition in consumer electronics, steel and other industries. It 
targets mainly smaller US-based firms, providing them with 
technical, marketing and financial advice, as well as training; and 
in some cases encouraging them to cooperate in joint R&D 
projects. The centers are financed by a combination of federal, 
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state and local government grants, and client fees.  The program 
received a doubling of its budget after the 2008 crisis.  
 
 The centers provide services via “direct delivery” and   
“brokerage”.  In direct delivery mode, a center sends one or more 
of its own experts to a firm to advise how to improve lean 
production or quality control, and how to find new clients; and it 
might bring firms together to explore network possibilities. In 
brokerage mode,  the center acts more indirectly, arranging 
private consultants to do much the same things. Andrew Schrank 
finds that centers headed by engineers tend to emphasise direct 
delivery, those headed by MBAs tend to do brokerage. He also 
finds that “Both models work, in the sense of providing high rates 
of return – the costs of MEP centers are low,  and there’s lots of 
low hanging fruit out there in the US” (personal communication, 
and Schrank, forthcoming).  
  
Other noteworthy initiatives come from the Small Business 
Administration (SBA), which makes Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) grants.  Federal agencies with large research 
budgets (like NIH and the Department of Energy) are required to 
allocate 2.5% of grants to the SBA, which in turn distributes about 
5,000 awards to 1,500 small firms per year. These awards are 
especially important in bridging university and commerce; for 
example, in recent years more than two thirds of the recipients 
include an academic or former academic among their founders.    
 
Industrial policy, by other names, received a big boost as 
part of the countercyclical policy response to the Crash of 2008 
and ensuing Great Recession, which blunted  the normal political 
opposition.  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) of 2009 supported an integrated package, including tax 
cuts for low- and middle-income Americans and for small 
businesses, assistance for the auto industry (eg Chrysler, General 
Motors), large-scale investment in science, technology, 
engineering, and maths (STEM) education, in the health 
industries, in clean energy/batteries/advanced materials, and in 
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infrastructure for communications, transportation and energy. 
However, note that the assistance to the auto industry was 
relatively small and condition-laden compared to favoured 
financial firms which received vast public money largely free of 
conditions. Both Chrysler and GM had to file for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection and emerged with new owners.    
 
 ARRA was further boosted after 2010 by several 
manufacturing-focused initiatives, including the National 
Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI), Materials 
Genome Initiative, and Robotics Center.   Inshoring 
manufacturing production received a 20% income tax credit. The 
2010 National Export Initiative boosted support for exporters.  
 
The ARRA was just one program among several stimulus 
programs in response to the 2008 crash.  By 2010, with the 
economy still close to recession, the Republicans, backed by 
billionaire financiers and their think-tanks,  had regrouped 
sufficiently to persuade a voting majority in the midterm elections 
that federal spending and government regulation were the barriers 
to private sector economic growth. Now back in control of  the 
House of Representatives, Republicans cut  the budgets for the 
stimulus programs,  including industrial policies, in the time-
honoured way.       
 
IV. Network industrial policy successes 
 
 The following three case studies of success stories help to 
illustrate the specific conditions, policies and mechanisms that  
fostered the emergence of state-guided networks. 6  
 
DARPA and SEMATECH 
                                                 
6 In addition to the factors mentioned below, competition between US states and cities 
for talent and resources probably helps to make network industrial policy more 
effective. US states benefit, both fiscally and politically, from their successes and 
suffer from their failures. In the UK, by contrast, public spending and planning is 
more centrally controlled, and local benefits and losses are more  absorbed into the 
national treasury.   
 
  
21 
21 
 
 The Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA 
(from time to time the D has been dropped), was founded in 1958, 
in response to the Soviet sputnik. Since then it has been a leading 
stimulator of technological innovation in -- amongst many things-
- computers, computer languages, and semi-conductors. For 
example, it was the earlier-mentioned agency which sponsored 
the research on how to build robust and dispersed computer 
networks, which led on to the “network of computer networks” 
we know as the Internet. Recently it has been stimulating research 
into a priority area where private R&D was lagging: optical 
interconnects in multicore microprocessors.  
 
Though DARPA is tiny (around  250 staff, of whom 140 are 
technical) and though it concentrates on over-the-horizon 
research, it still has to fend off "pork barrel", “picking winners” 
and "crony capitalism" attacks from market fundamentalists and 
techno-utopians arguing that philanthropists plus the three billion 
people coming online together constitute adequate self-
organizing innovation systems (see for example Diamandis, 
2012).  
 
 One of DARPA’s  many successes is SEMATECH,  a 
famous example of network-building industrial policy. DARPA 
and the semiconductor industry association prompted the creation 
of the SEMATECH consortium in 1987, in response to the virtual 
disappearance of American companies able to make the 
equipment needed to make latest-generation semi-conductors. 
The leading equipment makers were by then   Japanese, who 
tended to hold back the latest-generation equipment for six 
months of  "testing" by Japanese semi-conductor makers, giving 
the latter a strong competitive advantage over American rivals. 
DARPA and the semiconductor industry association persuaded  
fourteen  American semi-conductor makers to form a consortium 
to pool R&D and manufacturing capacities and re-enter the 
design and production of advanced semi-conductor-making 
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equipment. The Department of Defence (DARPA’s parent) 
funded the first five years.  
 
In the early years the consortium was fragile, especially 
when the semiconductor price cycle was up and the companies 
were making good profits; then they hesitated to send top-notch 
people to work for the consortium. DARPA's stewardship 
(funding and close collaboration at the technical level where its 
suggestions would be most appreciated)  helped to overcome 
collaborators' fears of either "getting screwed" by other 
collaborators' non-reciprocity or opportunism, or having their 
collaborators "screw up" through incompetence.  By 1994 it was 
well enough established that its board stopped further federal 
funding. It flourishes to this day.   
  
 
Public venture capital (VC) funds, pioneered by the CIA 
 
 Since the late 1990s many US government agencies have 
established VC funds. Though inspired by Silicon Valley venture 
capitalists, the public funds are not to make money, but to enable 
the agency to induce the development and adaptation of 
commercially viable technologies for agency needs. The funds 
make equity investments in (mainly) small and medium 
technology companies and play a hands-on role in those firms, at 
the same time helping to link firms together where the officials 
see complementarities.  By highlighting their co-partner role with 
private sector financiers and their dedication to market 
mechanisms they are able to fend off attacks by market 
fundamentalists.  
 
 Surprisingly, the origin of the federal agencies’ VC funds 
was a traditionally secretive and insular agency, the CIA. It 
established a VC arm, called In-Q-Tel, in 1999, in order to 
overcome the problem that traditional government procurement 
practices (established in a slower-moving technology era) meant 
it had to procure from large established companies which 
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themselves sourced many of their technologies from SMEs. The 
result was that the CIA often obtained technologies with a long 
delay, by which time they were no longer cutting-edge; and that 
the products did not match the agency’s specific operational 
needs. With its own VC fund the CIA could invest in nimble 
SMEs directly and get them to do its bidding. 
 
 Over the 2000s the federal VC model proliferated. The 
Army and the Navy, for example, both established VC funds. 
Non-military agencies did the same: for example, the Department 
of Energy established several; and NASA participated with a 
private non-profit VC fund.  Matthew Keller summarizes:  
 
“Public sector venture capital strategies rapidly became broadly 
accepted tools for spurring mission-oriented technical innovation 
and/or to transform government research into commercial 
products” (Keller 2011, 126).  
 
The Advanced Technology Program and the hazards of visibility 
 
 About the most visible segment of the US state’s efforts to 
promote technological innovation was the Advanced Technology 
Program (ATP).  The fate of the ATP illustrates what can happen 
when a hidden developmental state becomes visible in a polity 
gripped by market fundamentalism (Negoita, 2011).  
 
 ATP was created by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), within the Department of Commerce, in 
1988, in response to the earlier-mentioned fears of surging 
Japanese competition in high-tech. It could be thought of as a 
civilian counterpart to DARPA. It developed strong connections 
to industry and academia, to stimulate the early stages of  
advanced technologies that would not get private funding.  
 
 By many measures it was very successful. For example, 
firms whose R&D received ATP funding had a 50% shorter 
research cycle time than firms which applied to ATP for funding 
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but did not get it – giving the lie to the accusation that taxpayers’ 
money was being used to fund early-stage R&D which the firms 
would have done anyway.  Second, participants in ATP-
sponsored projects said that ATP participation generated a higher 
level of collaboration with other firms than would have occurred 
otherwise. Third, a slew of new products came out of ATP 
programs: for example, small disc drives (which paved the way 
for multibillion dollar markets in consumer electronics, such as 
the iPod), also flat panels and plant-based biodegradable plastics.  
 
 It did not hide its light under a barrel. Seeing a high profile 
“government intervention”, market fundamentalists targeted the 
ATP from 1994 onwards.  Operating through the House of 
Representatives, they continually cut its budget, to the point 
where in 2007 the Bush administration and the Republican 
Congress succeeded in axing it.  
 
V. Network industrial policy failures  
 
Photovoltaic energy systems 
 
 The case of solar photovoltaic (PV) energy systems 
illustrates that the success or failure of network industrial policy 
should not be judged only from the supply side (Knight 2011). As 
Schumpeter said, the technology pipeline consists of invention, 
innovation and diffusion; or in later language, research, 
development and deployment.  The US federal government 
played a vital role in making US-based networks of public and 
private actors the world’s leading source of PV inventions and 
innovations, starting in the 1970s.   
 
But it mounted no corresponding federal program to 
accelerate deployment of the innovations in public use; and state 
programs (for example, subsidies and feed-in tariffs) have been 
bitty and widely varying from state to state. Germany, Japan, and 
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Spain all raced ahead in installed capacity per capita. A recent 
report on national policies supporting solar PV deployment 
ranked the US fifth, behind Germany, France, Greece, and Italy.  
 
The basic reason for the mismatch between R&D, on the 
one hand, and deployment on the other, may be that the US has a 
more “locked-in” energy system than countries that have gone 
further with PV installation, with stronger lobbies defending 
fossil fuel generation. Hence politicians are willing to allocate 
funds for PV R&D but not for deployment, which might displace 
valued sources of campaign finance (the fossil fuel and  nuclear 
industries).  Nevertheless, US relative failure to deploy does not 
detract from the success of network industrial policy in 
stimulating PV R & D. 7     
 
Wind energy systems 
 
 As NASA’s future looked uncertain at the end of the Apollo 
space missions in the 1970s, it sought to build on its engineering 
successes and find new sources of federal revenues by pioneering 
R&D in wind energy, which the oil price surge of the 1970s made 
into a promising new energy source. On the demand side, the US 
Congress passed the National Energy Act, putting energy 
companies under obligation to offer attractive prices to wind 
energy suppliers to the grid. The government of California was 
especially active in promoting investment, to the point where by 
1984 California was home to 75 percent of the world’s 
commercial wind-energy capacity (Keller and Negoita, 2013).  
 
                                                 
7 The collapse of Solyndra, the California-based manufacturer of solar panels, in September 2011, 
prompted the standard sing-along refrain from the right that “government cannot pick winners”.  The 
Department of Energy had given it a $535 million federally guaranteed loan to help move an 
innovation to full-scale commercial development. However, the loan came on top of large amounts of 
private investment, and it was private investors who were “picking winners”. The company collapsed 
because its internal management was a mess ( Nocera, 2011).   
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 But most of the turbines in the US were imported from  
Denmark. The NASA/ Department of Energy wind turbine 
project largely failed to produce commercially viable ones. Why? 
Its  mission-oriented approach led project managers  to plan to 
“leap-frog” the commercial designs then available, starting at the 
beginning of the R&D pipeline, giving little attention to costs and 
production. They integrated few private manufacturers or users 
of turbines into their research programs.  Moreover, their main 
manufacturers were the defence and aerospace contractors with 
which they had long-established relations, including Boeing, 
Lockheed, Westinghouse, Alcoa, and General Electric --  for 
whom wind turbines were a tiny side-line and for whom inter-
firm collaboration was unwelcome. 
 
 In Denmark, private wind enthusiasts had begun to generate 
wider interest in upgrading existing technology by the early 
1970s; and by the late 1970s had created several collaborative 
national associations. The state came in behind them (“following 
the market”) with investment subsidies and a minimum purchase 
price for wind energy. Most important, it established a national 
wind turbine testing center. This center  set standards and 
provided quality control, also gave advice and spurred collective 
problem solving between makers and users. Its engineers became 
the central pool of competences, acting as hub for the engineers 
and technicians at scattered (private) production sites.  They had 
to approve investment projects before the investors got access to 
state subsidies.  
 
 Denmark’s network success was the other side of the US 
failure to create a body to:  (1) provide standards, certification  
and quality control in a new field, (2) bring users and makers 
together to share problems and solutions, (3) build trust, (4) 
sustain the government’s commitment to promoting the industry.  
 
Advanced batteries 
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 By 2008 the US had only two domestic advanced battery 
manufacturers, and Japanese companies alone had 57 percent of 
the world market (Keller and Negoita, 2013). Yet in the early 
1990s the federal government had  led a consortium of three big 
US auto makers charged with developing new generation electric 
vehicles and advanced batteries. Ten years later it was generally 
considered a failure.  One of the main reasons was its dominance 
by major auto companies. These companies marginalized small 
and medium companies in the venture,  lobbied government 
against efforts to cut reliance on the internal combustion engine, 
and resisted links with battery companies.  
 
Another effort began in the early 2000s with a new group of 
collaborators, which had little more success.  This time one of the 
main reasons was the general lack of enthusiasm of the George 
W. Bush administration for promoting alternative fuels, and the 
resulting lack of enthusiasm of the intended collaborators.  Also, 
many of the collaborators had outsourced production overseas, 
isolating relevant competences from each other.   
 
 The Japanese government started at about the same time as 
the US, the early 1990s, to develop advanced batteries. Ironically, 
it – specifically MITI – drew on lessons it had learned from US 
success at network industrial policy in forming collaborations 
between public agencies, universities and firms (a contrast with 
Japan’s long tradition of centralized industrial policy). So it 
created a consortium including car makers,  battery companies, 
government labs and universities, with a dedicated 10 year budget 
(much longer than the US equivalent) and a mandate to work 
simultaneously on basic and prototype research. It extended tax 
concessions to R&D undertaken specifically in university-
industry projects; it encouraged commercial spin-off companies 
from university research; and it encouraged  university professors 
to become company directors. The project was supervised by a 
unit within MITI, one of whose main aims was to ensure that 
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mutual benefit prevailed over opportunism (some companies 
utilizing others’ knowledge without contributing their own).  The 
participants had much more of their operations located within 
Japan than did their US counterparts, making it easier to forge 
links between complementary competences.     
 
 
VI. Evaluation of network-building industrial policy 
   
 The foregoing is a small measure of evidence that the US 
has practiced industrial policy on a substantial scale,  without 
much central coordination.  In the words of Andrew Schrank and 
Josh Whitford:   
 
“The federal government has been pursuing industrial policy 
within decentralized political institutions for well over a 
generation… American industrial policies  go beyond 
preservation of market competition, maintenance of macro 
stability, and provision of public goods to address firm-specific 
needs in a host of different ways and through a variety of different 
agencies” (Schrank and Whitford, 2009).   
 
In the words of another study,  
 
“Below the ideological surface, a powerful ‘jerry-built’ substrate 
has emerged of federal, state and local government innovation 
support programs each filling gaps in the other” (Etzkowitz, et al. 
2008, 685).  
 
An official involved in these programs said, “We definitely see 
the programs as a de facto industrial policy, but we cannot use 
that term, so we usually call it R&D policy” (quoted in Schrank 
and Whitford, 2009).  
 
 How to evaluate these programs?  One step is to challenge 
the presumption of the “varieties of capitalism” literature that the 
US’s strong separation of powers (between executive, legislature 
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and judiciary, and between federal, state and local) handicaps 
industrial policy to the point where it tends not to be  effective 
(see the Mann quote above).  
 
The argument can plausibly be turned on its head. The 
decentralized type of US industrial policy has economic 
advantages: it better fits both the US’s increasingly decentralized 
and networked production structure and its separation of powers. 
As previously vertically integrated firms have become de-
integrated smaller firms have mushroomed, scattered around the 
country. By 2003 half of all PhD’s employed by the private sector 
worked for firms with fewer than 500 employees, plus tens of 
thousands of PhD scientists and engineers who are self-employed 
or own a small business (Block 2011, 18). As their share of 
production grows, so their gains from networks with on-going 
relationships grow.  By being brought into innovation networks 
they are more likely to compete on the high road (high skills, 
innovation) than on the low road (low wages).  Moreover, 
decentralization – with programs run by many agencies at 
different levels and locations – encourages more experimentation.  
 
 A second step is to ask the question,  if inter-firm networks 
can bring gains (not everywhere, but in sectors where demand is 
uncertain or volatile, supply interdependencies high, and 
technical change fast), why presume that the helping hand of the 
state brings net gains, on top of what would be achieved by 
networks formed autonomously by firms themselves?  The short 
answer is that state involvement can help to correct “network 
failure” (in contexts where network governance would be 
desirable were it to obtain). Autonomous networks may fail 
(meaning absence of networks or fragile and short-lived ones) for 
at least two reasons.  
 
 One relates to the financing of innovation. In the general 
case production can be financed: (1) out of sales, (2) from bank 
loans or other borrowings, or (3) from equity issues. Investment 
in innovation may be financed out of sales by big established 
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firms but not by small new  firms ; it can be financed only with 
difficulty from borrowings (debt) on the basis of prospective 
profits, because uncertainty is high; which leaves external equity 
as a major source of financing for innovation investment, 
especially for small new firms. But just because they are small 
and new these firms often have difficulty raising equity finance.  
Hence at the margin, financing from public agencies (whether in 
the form of debt or equity), and public validation of the worth of 
the investment, can tip the balance for private financiers and 
accelerate the R&D process (Shapiro and Milberg, 2012).  
 
 The second merit of state stewardship comes from the fact 
that networks – where (often competing) firms pool knowledge 
and perhaps specializations, in a spirit of reciprocity – are 
vulnerable to Prisoners Dilemma incentives. Firms may try to 
gain from others without reciprocating, prompting  other firms to 
exit saying, “they screwed me”.  The authoritative hand of the 
state can curb the incentives to defect. Likewise the state can 
intervene in cases where firms want to exit because they think 
others are incompetent and not able to act reciprocally even 
though they want to; here exiting firms may say,  “they screwed 
up” (Schrank and Whitford, 2009).  
 
  It is, however, difficult to evaluate the economic rate of 
return of scattered programs of the US kind, and these difficulties 
provide market fundamentalists with reasons to presume that they 
are a waste of taxpayers’ money compared to whatever the free 
market would have delivered. But we can be  confident  that :  
 
 The programs have developed valuable products and 
processes. Recently US government network-building has 
helped US firms to secure the lead in globally important 
industries ranging from mobile telecommunications, as seen 
in Apple’s triumph over RIM and Nokia, to hydraulic 
fracking, whose economic potential was transformed by 
public-private research projects backed by the Department 
of Energy.  
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 The programs have been able to withdraw benefits from 
“losers”, at least in the civilian industrial sector (as distinct 
from agriculture and defence, where post-2008 increases in 
agricultural subsidies and the defence budget force even 
more draconian cuts in non-defence public spending).   
 
 Firm networks not encompassed in public network 
programs have a higher rate of decline or breakup – which 
on the face of it argues for the value of public involvement. 
For example, Sherrie Human and Keith Provan report that 
of the small firm networks (outside public programs) they 
studied in the mid 1990s more than 60% had broken up by 
the time of their restudy in 1998 (Human and Provan, 2000). 
Maryann Feldman and Maryellen Kelley  provide evidence 
that firms within publicly sponsored networks are more 
likely to sustain collaboration than those outside  (Feldman 
and Kelley, 2001).  
 
In short, judging the success of particular network industrial 
policy projects or the whole program – comparing gains against 
costs, but in a dynamic rather than the standard static cost/benefit 
framework (where the “crowding out” costs  tend to dominate 
the benefits) -- is inevitably difficult and open to dispute.  But 
three points are clear. First, many network-building projects 
have produced large gains. Second, the presumption that the 
“free market” of competing private sector investors would have 
produced better results overall rests on ignorance of the gains 
obtained through inter-firm networks.  
 
Third, the case studies of US successes and failures suggest 
that performance depends heavily on the specifics of policy and 
institutional “regimes” for each case, and is not determined 
largely by the mega-structures of varieties of capitalism, 
whether American, Japanese, Danish,  or other.  It is not obvious 
that agencies of the US state could not have produced successes 
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in some of the energy fields where they failed, described earlier, 
had they come closer to copying features of the policy regime in 
the same fields in other countries. It is not obvious, for example, 
that agencies could not have created testing and quality control 
centers for wind turbines like the one created by the Danish 
government without having the centers hamstrung by market 
fundamentalists. On the other hand, it is also true that the wind 
turbine industry in the US faced much greater opposition than in 
Denmark from the fossil fuel lobby.      
 
VII. Conclusion      
  
 
By way of conclusion, ten points. One,  the US has developed 
a hidden “developmental state” over the past two to three decades, 
going well beyond the earlier focus on the military . Reviewing 
the history of US industrial policy since 1989 Fred Block 
remarks,  
 
“What is most striking about this recent period is that, with the 
exception of the fights over ATP [Advanced Technology 
Program], there is a discrepancy between the growing importance 
of these federal initiatives and the absence of public debate or 
discussion about them….journalists rarely report on these 
programs, few academics write about them, and most politicians 
ignore them” (Block, 2011, 13).  
 
Two,  the existence of this array of industrial policy 
programs is surprising in the context of  (1) the presumptions of 
mainstream, exchange-oriented economists that “industrial 
policy” is generally to be avoided, and (2) the presumptions of 
political economists and other institutionalists that the US 
political structure (three coequal pillars at federal level, and a 
federal-state-local hierarchy), plus market fundamentalist 
ideology, renders government-led attempts to steer investment 
ineffective, or worse.  Also contributing to scholars’ neglect is a 
presumption that industrial policy means East Asian/ French/ 
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Brazilian-type  policies complete with national indicative plans 
and high profile national steering agencies.    
 
     
Three, when agencies have to justify programs of this type 
they invoke the familiar criterion of “government intervention to 
correct exceptional cases of market failure”. This makes them 
seem consistent with standard neoclassical theory. But some of 
the programs go well beyond any plausible notion of correcting 
market failure, to the state imparting directional thrust towards  
new technologies where private profit-seeking would not draw 
investment on its own or where the agency sees a chance to 
accelerate the direction some private actors are already moving 
in.    
 
 Four, the recent empirical research provides a basis for 
theories of network success and failure, to put alongside the 
familiar neoclassical theories of market success and failure. The 
earlier discussion suggests several building blocks of such 
theories.  For example,  contrary to the thrust of the varieties 
of capitalism literature, the decentralized and network-building 
form of US policies may have net economic advantages (as well 
as the political ones): advantages from being a better fit with the 
emerging more decentralized form of production structure, in 
which a growing proportion of total output comes from smaller, 
less vertically-integrated firms; and advantages of 
experimentation and avoidance of “group think”. 
  
Another building block is the distinction between two  
causes of network failure: collective action breaks apart when 
some parties see others as “incompetent” (“I will exit because 
they screwed up”) or when some parties see others as 
“opportunistic” (“I will exit because they screwed me”).   Policies 
and institutions to promote networks have to counter both sources 
of failure (Schrank and Whitford, 2009). A third building block 
is the distinction between government leading the market, 
government following the market, and government promoting 
  
34 
34 
more sector-neutral functions. In one sector or industry the 
government’s role may alternate over time (Wade, 1990).     
 
 
 Five, for all the positive trends in both industrial policy 
practice and in social science understanding of it we have to 
remember that US high tech manufacturing is not in robust 
health.  The trade balance in high tech products went from 
strong surpluses in the 1990s to a deficit of $100 bn in 2011.  
The supply of graduates in science and engineering is far from 
sufficient. IBM,  Du Pont and others have been offshoring their 
R&D. Productivity growth has persistently declined over the 
past dozen years.  One sign of the times is that China (as of 
2016) has the largest number of computers among the world’s 
fastest 500 supercomputers;  it has the world’s fastest 
supercomputer for the seventh year running; and its fastest 
machine uses Chinese-made  microprocessors rather than from 
Silicon Valley’s Intel (International New York Times, 2016).  
 
Six,  these trends are not ringing alarm fells as loudly as 
they should, reflecting (as one reason) a common assumption 
that as long as “start-ups” and “knowledge work” stay at home,  
we in developed countries should let the “scale ups” and their 
factory jobs go overseas to cheaper labour sites, and push for 
more  trade liberalization (exchange) to facilitate this division of 
labour.  This view expresses a misplaced faith in the power of 
start-ups to create jobs at home. Only “scale-ups”, when 
technology goes from prototype to mass production, are an 
engine of job growth. Scale-ups depend on  pre-existing  
ecosystems of supplier-customer relations where  technical 
knowledge accumulates and experience builds on experience. 
Abandoning today’s “commodity” manufacturing can preclude 
entry to tomorrow’s new industry (Grove, 2010, Berger, 2013). 
So industrial policy should focus not just on innovation but also 
on incentivizing certain fields of commodity manufacturing at 
home, by making it less attractive for manufacturers to decouple 
from the national economy.  
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 Seven, US industrial policy could be rendered more 
effective with more coordination between the various federal 
agency programs, by means of a central agency near the top of 
government with real muscle.  Michael Porter,  who used to deny 
the merit of national-level strategy, has come around to the view 
that  
 
“Congress would benefit from a bipartisan joint planning group 
to coordinate an overall set of [development] priorities. More up 
or down votes on comprehensive legislative programs are needed 
to allow a shift to a coherent set of policies and away from lots of 
separate bills” (Porter, 2008).  
 
Such a central agency exercising comprehensive foresight is 
crucial for formulating a path away from catastrophic climate 
change, given the needed radical changes in production and 
consumption  (to raise the productivity of resources and cut the 
material content of consumption);  not just in the US and the 
West, but for full global development.  
 
Eight, one of the big flaws in US industrial policies-in-
general is that state investment in R&D is not set in a venture 
capital framework, where the state gets financial returns directly  
from successful investments in the private sector made on the 
back of that R&D (as in the Apple example given earlier). The 
state absorbs high risks and uncertainties, and often bears high 
capital costs; some 57% of funding for basic R&D came from the 
federal government in 2008, only 18% from the business sector. 
But the state passes on the knowledge with no mechanism to 
receive a return on derived private innovations.  The key is to 
establish revolving funds so that the inevitable losses on public 
R&D can be offset by the gains, as with private venture 
capitalists.  This would make the funding of public R&D less 
dependent on a political process.  
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In the words of Mariana Mazzucato:  
  
“Why is the State eagerly blamed for failed investments in ventures like 
the American Supersonic Transport (SST) project (when it ‘picks losers’), 
and not praised for successful early stage investments in companies like 
Apple (when it ‘picks winners’)? And why is the State not rewarded for its 
direct investments in basic and applied research that lead to successful 
technologies that underpin revolutionary commercial products …?” 
Mazzucato, 2013, 88).   
 
 
 Nine,  the various programs of the kind described here are  
to be understood as “inner wheels” of the American system of 
manufacturing, whose impacts depend heavily on outer wheels.    
One outer wheel is the amount of R&D to GDP. Here the US is 
far ahead of most countries: public and private investment in 
innovation was 2.8% of GDP in 2008, below Japan but much 
above the European Union-15 at 1.9%. But the US has become 
dangerously dependent on public-sector investment in basic 
research, as big publicly-quoted US firms become focused on 
financial engineering more than real engineering. A second outer 
wheel is  macroeconomic management, which may be more, or 
less, friendly to different sectors: for example, high interest rates 
discourage capital-intensive investment,  and overvalued 
exchange rates hinder export-oriented manufacturing. A third 
outer wheel is income distribution.  The decoupling of 
productivity growth from incomes over the 2000s (the first time 
on record that the incomes of the large majority of Americans 
have stagnated or fallen through apparently good times to 2007)  
blunts the efficacy of industrial policy. Slow growth of median 
incomes relative to productivity is a recipe for anxiety, anger, an 
upsurge of “government is the problem, not the solution”, 
financial crises, and lost decades (Wade, 2012, 2013).  
 
 Finally, the organized hypocrisy captured in the study of 
the US biotech industry quoted at the beginning – “government 
and business leaders simultaneously advocated government 
intervention to foster the development of the biotech industry 
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and argued hypocritically that government should let the free 
market work” – characterizes  American industrial policy as a 
whole.  See the  epigraphs. With American industrial policy 
mostly tucked away from public and academic attention, the US 
government has not had to navigate the tensions inherent in 
telling other  countries – directly in bilateral and regional trade 
and investment agreements and indirectly through Structural 
Adjustment Programs in the inter-state organizations where it is 
the dominant actor --  “do as I say, not as I do”.  It says simply, 
“do as I (say I ) do”. And so, ever since the 1980s, American 
and other western governments have applied strong  pressure on 
developing countries to “follow comparative advantage” and 
keep specializing in exportable primary commodities, tourism 
and cheap-labor  assembly manufacturing -- and stop pressing 
for  “policy space” to develop production capabilities (Wade, 
2013). This pressure continues imperial countries’ long history 
of trying to stop peripheral countries from entering dynamic 
sectors.  The post 1980s push relies not on gunboats, colonial 
restrictions,  and racial ideology, but on conditional lending, 
“free trade” agreements, and neoclassical theory – the latter 
apparently  justifying the proposition  that developing countries 
should stick to their sectors of comparative advantage in their 
own best interest. This is a prescription for sustaining the 
existing core-periphery structure of the world economy, in 
which the activities with increasing returns, high linkages, and 
high price and income elasticity of demand are located mainly in 
the core, sustaining the core’s prosperity relative to the 
periphery  (Wade, 2003). One lesson from this essay is that 
policy communities in other  countries and in inter-state 
development organizations like the World Bank and IMF should 
push back when American policy makers and academics urge 
them to stick to the Washington Consensus “fundamentals” 
whose efficacy can be seen from the economic success of the 
United States. The key point is this. For a developing country to 
sustain movement of the production structure into higher value-
added activities (deploying technologies mostly developed 
elsewhere) the Washington Consensus agenda — opening the 
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economy to the international economy and improving 
institutions of exchange — is at most a necessary condition. The 
American experience, and that of just about all the post-Second 
World War success stories, underlines the need for public 
policies to incentivize the production  of some activities over 
others. Creating a level playing field does not ensure that the 
players turn up to play.    END 
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